Wealth, Weather Risk and the Composition and Profitability of Agricultural Investments by Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Binswanger, Hans P.
Bulletin Number 89-4
ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  CENTER
S..  .. . daft,
,-  ---  ^ ' -A
WEALTH, WEATHER  RISK AND
THE  COMPOSITION  AND  PROFITABILITY:
OF AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS
Mark  R. Rosenzweig
Hans P. Binswanger
ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  CENTER
Department  of Economics, Minneapolis
Department  of Agricultural  and Applied  Economics, St. Paul
UNIVERSITY  OF  MINNESOTA
June, 1989Wealth, Weather Risk and  the Composition







June  1989A major issue  in the  literature concerned with economic  development has
been the relationship between average productivity and the distribution of
wealth, in particular  the distribution of  land.  Attention has primarily
been focused on how features  of rural labor markets  in low-income  settings,
inclusive of market segmentation and nutrition-wage  interactions, entail
efficiency gains  from an equalizing redistribution of  land  (e.g.,  Mazumdar,
1977;  Dasgutpa and Ray, 1984).  These concerns have in part spawned a large
number of empirical  tests of technical scale economies  (e.g.,  Bardhan,
1973),  farm household "separability" (Lopez,  1986;  Pitt and Rosenzweig,
1986;  Benjamin, 1988),  and health-wage associations  (Behrman and Deolalikar,
1987).
Studies  related to  the  distribution-efficiency issue  in the context of
low-income rural  areas have tended to  ignore risk considerations,  although
the advantages of large landowners  in obtaining credit has been recognized
(Sen, 1966).  Despite  the  growing evidence that  farmers  in  low-income
environments are  characterized by aversion to  risk  (Moscardi and deJanvry,
1977;  Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978;  Binswanger, 1980, Antle, 1987),  however,
there has been little empirical  evidence on the  importance of risk in
shaping  the  actual allocation of production resources among farmers
differentiated by wealth.1   Empirical work on contractual relations  in low-
income rural  areas has also not been successful  in obtaining credible or
consistent empirical relationships between wealth and risk behavior  (Bell
and Srinivasan, 1985),  in part because  of population heterogeneity in risk
attitudes.
While  it might be  thought that  a principle  impediment to  obtaining
better evidence on risk-related behavior in low-income  countries  is  the
unavailability of data,  an advantage almost unique  to  the  study ofagricultural environments  is  that one of  the major sources of risk, weather,
has been recorded for long periods of time  in most countries of the world.
Despite  this,  the literature on agricultural risk has not exploited actual
weather  data to measure risk,  although rainfall  information has been
fruitfully used to  study intertemporal consumption behavior  (Wolpin,  1982;
Paxson, 1988).
In this paper we utilize unique panel data from rural  India on
investments, wealth and rainfall to  examine how the  composition of
productive and non-productive asset holdings varies across farmers with
different overall  levels of total wealth holdings and across farmers  facing
different degrees  of weather risk.  In particular, we  propose and implement
a test of  the central  feature of an  investment equilibrium characterized by
risk-averse agents, namely the  existence  of a positive association between
the average returns  to  individual production assets and their sensitivity to
weather variability.  We also estimate how the  influence of weather risk on
asset portfolios  and farm profitability varies with measured risk
preferences and with total wealth holdings.
In part one of  the paper, we set out a simple framework for exploring
the determination  of agricultural  investments under risk which explicitly
incorporates the  first two moments  of the  distribution of weather outcomes.
The analysis  rests on the  estimation of a restricted profit function in
which it  is  assumed that farmers choose a set of assets  differentially
sensitive to weather-variability based on their risk preferences but
allocate resources  to  maximize profits after the resolution of uncertainty.
Section two contains  a description of the data and a discussion of
measurement issues, with particular attention to  the measurement of weather.
In section three, the profit function estimates are presented and tests ofscale economies,  of the  applicability of  the  two-moment distributional
assumption, and of the risk-aversion investment equilibrium are reported.
In the next section, estimates of the  influence of experimentally-
ascertained risk preferences, weather risk and wealth on  the riskiness and
profitability  of farmers'  portfolios of  investments are  estimated.  These
estimates  are also used to  test for  the  existence of risk-preference
heterogeneity.
The empirical  results reject the hypothesis that  the composition of
agricultural  investments reflects technical scale economies but support  the
hypothesis  that asset portfolios are  influenced significantly by farmers'
aversion to  risk.  The  results also  indicate  that the trade-off between
profit variability and average profit returns to wealth is  significant and
that the  loss in efficiency associated with risk mitigation is  considerably
higher among the  less wealthy farmers.  Average incomes  are thus not only
lower but  income inequality is  exacerbated relative  to  the distribution of
wealth as  a consequence of uninsured weather risk.  These results are  shown
to be consistent with decreasing relative and absolute  risk aversion rather
than solely with wealth-related credit market or other risk diffusion
advantages.  However, the  results indicate  that for farmers  in the  top
quintile  of the wealth distribution, increases  in risk do not lead to
reductions in the measured riskiness  of investment portfolios and thus to
decreased profits.  A wealth-equalizing redistribution of  land could thus
increase average profitability, but only  if  land is  acquired from the upper
tail of the wealth distribution, although such a program may be  less
efficient than improving access to  consumption credit  or other means of
insurance.1.  Theoretical Framework
We consider a farmer with  total asset holdings W who allocates his n
production assets prior to  the realization of a random weather outcome w in
order to maximize his expected utility of consumption.  Because we will be
directly estimating the  effects on the  investment portfolio of measured
characteristics of  the distribution of the stochastic variable, it  is
particularly convenient to represent the farmer's  expected utility rankings
for consumption in terms of his preference ordering over moments of the
consumption distribution.  This  is  so because it  is straightforward to  map
changes  in the moments of  the observed stochastic variable  (weather) into
changes  in these characteristics of the  consumption distribution.  Moreover,
Meyer  (1987) has demonstrated the consistency of the  two  sets of rankings,
for the first  two moments of  the distribution of payoffs,  when the
stochastic payoff variables differ from each other only by location and
scale parameters.  Under this  condition, a wide variety of functional forms
for expected utility models are consistent with models  incorporating mean-
standard deviation rankings.  Since we utilize direct information on the
stochastic  variable  we  will  be  able  to  test  for  this  condition.
The farmer maximizes
(1)  U - V(c,ac),  VP > 0, Va  <  0,
where Mc and ac  are  the mean and standard deviation of consumption. Meyer
has  also  demonstrated that the quasi-concavity of  (1) is  sufficient to
guarantee convexity of preferences,  so  that V  V  <  0 and V  V  - V 2
'1L  '  U  aV
0.
The farmer can influence  the arguments  in (1) by choosing an
appropriate mix of production investments.  Normalizing, arbitrarily, by the
4nth production asset and assuming a profit function linear homogenous  (CRS)
in the  investment inputs, we  can express  the  relationship between the mean
and standard deviation of farmer profits, yn and an,  the productive
investment portfolio vector ai, where  the element ai  =  value share of the
ith  investment input  in total  wealth, and the mean and standard deviation of
the stochastic weather distribution, A  and a  , respectively,  as:
(2)  pu  =  Wf(5i)M ,  and
(3)  a 11 - WT(ai)a,,  fa'  r  <  0. 2
Note that in  (2) the mean and standard deviation of profits  per unit of
wealth are homogenous of degree 0 in  total wealth, reflecting the CRS
assumption, but are of degree  1 in  the  first two moments, respectively, of
the weather distribution.  The homogeneity assumption for  the weather
variable  is  similar  to most specifications of stochastic output  in the
theoretical literature on agricultural risk utilizing the expected utility
framework  (see Feder 1977).  We have also  for simplicity assumed that there
is  one source  of stochastic variability in profits.  It  is  straightforward
to consider multiple weather  shocks,  and we test for  these below.  With one
source of profit variability, F  measures  the  riskiness of the asset  stock
composition.
The  mean  of  consumption  is  given  by
(4)  u  =  u"
The mapping of  the  standard deviation in profits  to  that of consumption
depends on what  is assumed about capital market constraints.  If assets
cannot be sold and borrowing is  not possible  then a c  =  a 11 , while  if farmers
are fully  insured against  income  fluctuations, ac  - 0.  Most likely, thesituation is  somewhere  in between these  extreme cases.  Moreover, the
sensitivity of consumption variability to  ex post profit variability may
depend on the  total  level of asset holdings, for which  there may be  a
limited market and which may serve as  collateral for  loans.  Rosenzweig and
Stark  (1989),  for example,  report that the association between the variances
of intertemporal profits  and consumption was significantly lower for Indian
farmers with greater inherited wealth, and Binswanger and Rosenzweig  (1986)
report that wealthier Indian farmers were substantially heavier borrowers.
Both of these  studies utilized the  same  survey data to be  employed in this
study. Accordingly, we express the relationship between consumption and
profit variability as
(5)  acc  - (W)j,
with x'(W) <  0.
The  set of  first order conditions are  given by
(6)  V f  - -V a   a,  i-,...,n-
i  i
where  fa  fi  - fn  and F,-  Fi  - Fn,  with  fj  and rj  the marginal
i  i  J  J
contributions of the jth production capital  to  the mean and standard
deviation, respectively, of profits.  Expression (6) indicates that  if
farmers are  risk-averse and capital assets differ  in  their contributions to
profit variability (ra  / 0),  then as  long as  farmers'  incomes  are not
i
perfectly insured,  (0 <  K <  1) (mean)  profits will be lower  than mean profits
would be  if  farmers maximized (expected) profits,  since the  profit
maximization condition is  f, =  0.
i
A  readily testable  implication of an investment equilibrium
characterized by risk-aversion, embodied in  (6),  is  the existence of apositive association across all production assets between marginal
contributions  to  the mean and to  the variability of profits, as  for any two
assets  i and k,
(7)  fa  /fa  - /
i  k  i  k
A second implication of  imperfectly insured consumption combined with
risk-averse investment behavior  that follows from the positive relationship
between r.  and f  is  that a shift  to assets  that in equilibrium make
i  i
higher-than-average  contributions  to profit variability ("risky" assets)
induces a rise  in mean profits, since risky assets must have higher  average
returns.  Farmers more willing or more able  to bear risk thus should not
only hold high-r  investment portfolios but should exhibit higher  average
profits  per  unit  of  wealth.
To establish the  conditions under which the  efficiency and portfolio
riskiness  of farmers changes with total wealth holdings and to  assess how
the sensitivity of profits  to changes  in weather risk is altered as wealth
levels  increase, we  first note,  from Meyer  (1987):
1.  Farmers  exhibit decreasing, constant, or increasing relative  risk
aversion as  R - (Va  +  Vaaac)V- 1  -(V  c  + Vac)Va/V2  aVl +  bV V-2
- 0.
2.  Farmers  exhibit decreasing, constant,  or increasing absolute  risk
--  2
aversion as  A =  VV  -l V  VV/V 2   0.
For simplicity, assume that there  are only two types of capital  i and j
and that  in equilibrium f,  and Fa  >  0,  i.e.  investment good i is  the  risky
i  i
asset, and thus high-a i  portfolios  are both riskier and more profitable.  The
effect of  a mean-preserving change in the  standard deviation of the weather
distribution on the  choice of  the risky asset is  given by:(8)  - - [(Vaif.  +  Voaa ao)Wr +  ara  ] 1-
da  i  i  i
- -K[SWT  +  Vr  ]l-1
i
where, suppressing subscripts,  - Vf  +e  +  Vf2W  +  Var aa  +  Vaa ra  W
+  2Va faWaW  <  0 by second order conditions.
The  first term in brackets in  (8),  SWT, is  the effect on the riskiness
of investment due to a a wealth-independent  increase  in the variability of
consumption, and is negative;  the  second bracketed term  is negative as  long
as  ai is  the risky asset.  Thus,  ceteris paribus, when farmers are not fully
insured  (xc  4 0) an increase in weather risk reduces the riskiness  of their
portfolios of production capital and mean profitability.
The effect of a change  in the  level of wealth on ai  is:
dai  dai
i.  i  1 (9)  --  -[R  + --  a, ']-
dW  dao
Because of the homogeneity assumptions  embodied in (2) and  (3),  an increase
in wealth  increases by  the  same proportion both the mean and standard
deviation of profits and consumption.  It  is  thus  relative  risk aversion (R)
that matters in determining the relationship between the profitability or
riskiness of  the capital portfolio and total wealth, as  shown in  (9).  The
second term in brackets reflects  the  extent to which wealth directly reduces
the variability in consumption for given variability  in farm profits via the
asset or credit market.  Thus,  if  c'  - 0, farmers cannot save or barter,
decreasing relative  aversion is  necessary and sufficient for wealthier
farmers  to be holding more risky portfolios of production capital  and to  be
more efficient. However, with wealth accumulation being advantageous in the
credit market and/or with asset  resale possibilities,  so  that A' <  0,decreasing relative  risk aversion is  not a necessary condition for
consumption riskiness  and profitability per unit of wealth to  rise with
total wealth.
The  relationship between  total wealth and the  impact of weather
riskiness  on the  riskiness  (and profitability)  of the stock of capital
inputs, assuming third derivatives of  (1) are small,  is  given by
(10)  d(dai/da~)/dW-  -[r,[  a +  rS]- 1
i
da. di  I1 - [-fa  A  +  F  wS +  araan  +  bfaa]
da  i  i
K'  dai
+-  [  --  ac'Vara  a
/c  daw  i
In expression  (10),  both absolute  (A) and relative  risk aversion
matter.  The  first bracketed term  is positive if a is non-negative, which is
true when farmers  are characterized by non-increasing constant relative  risk
aversion;  similarly, the  second bracketed term must be positive  if  farmers
are  characterized by non-increasing absolute and relative  risk aversion
(A,a,b  >  0) and f and P  are concave.  The last bracketed term in  (10) arises
from the potential effect  of wealth in  facilitating consumption smoothing ex
post  ((' <  0) and contributes unambiguously  to wealth diminishing  the effect
of weather variability on portfolio riskiness and profitability.  Thus, non-
increasing absolute and relative  risk aversion are  sufficient, but not
necessary,  for  the  investments of wealthier farmers  to be  less  influenced by
weather risk.
2.  The Data
The preceding framework indicates  that  to  test for  the existence of aninvestment equilibrium conditioned by risk and to  assess the  interactions
between total wealth holdings, agricultural  risk and the composition of
investment holdings requires  time-series  data on investments, wealth and
weather.  The ICRISAT Indian village surveys  (Singh et al.,  1985) provide
detailed time-series  information on agricultural production and investments
for farm households over a period of up  to  ten years.  Begun in the crop
year 1975-76  in six villages  in three agroclimatic regions of the  Indian
semi-arid tropics, the survey collected longitudinal information
approximately every three weeks on all transactions  (purchases, sales,
production, investment) for 40 households in each village,  30  of which were
cultivating households.  At the conclusion of the  survey, there were  ten
years of information collected for three of the villages, seven years for
one, and nine years of information for two  of the original  six villages.  In
1980-81,  two other villages  (each with 40 households) were added to  the
survey and were surveyed for four years;  another  two villages  (80
households) were added in 1981-82 and were surveyed for three years.
In addition to  the transaction information,  in each year on
approximately July 1 a complete  inventory of the households'  asset holdings
was  taken.  All of  the information was obtained by resident village
investigators.  The  ICRISAT wealth and investment portfolio data are  thus
likely  to be substantially more accurate than i:.  most surveys, particularly
those occurring at one point in time.  As  part of  the survey, daily rainfall
information was  also obtained.  It  is  thus  possible to  construct a number of
alternative measures of rainfall  incidence and variability.
Two other features of  the  ICRISAT village survey make it  particularly
well-suited for studying the consequences of agricultural risk for
investment.  First, the separation theorem (Tobin (1958))  does not appear to
10be  applicable  to  the villages.  That is,  farmers  are not generally able to
invest in a riskless asset.  In principle, farmers could alter  the  riskiness
of their investment portfolios by merely changing the  proportion of  their
holdings that  they lease out at a fixed rental rate, while arranging
productive assets  on the  self-cultivation portion of their portfolios so  as
to maximize profits.  In that case, the composition of production portfolios
(but not leasing behavior) would be  invariant  to  risk.  While the ICRISAT
data  do not provide information on the  contractual terms  for leased-out
land, in less than  seven percent  of the  observations  (household-years) are
farmers  renting in any  land at fixed rental rates. 3  Very few farmers are
thus  able or willing  to  absorb the  risk entailed by taking on a fixed-rent
contract, leaving almost all farmers fully exposed to weather risk.  In
approximately  21 percent of the  observations, farmers  are  share renting
land;  this  contractual form, of course, mitigates but does not eliminate
risk.
A second advantage of the ICRISAT survey  is  that the farmers  in six of
the villages were subject to  an experiment designed to  directly elicit their
aversion to  risk (Binswanger, 1980).  It  is  thus possible  to  test whether
our non-experimentally obtained measures  of portfolio riskiness  are related
to  these independently-ascertained measures  of subjective  risk-aversion.
The  semi-arid tropics  in which the  ICRISAT study villages reside are
characterized by very low levels  of erratically-distributed rainfall.  As  a
consequence, agricultural incomes  are low and quite variable--in the  six
original villages for which there  is  from seven to  ten years of  information,
the average coefficient of variation in total farm profits  (net of  the value
of family labor) was  127.  In contrast, our analysis  of the  earnings  of U.S.
white males aged 25-29  in 1971,  surveyed in seven rounds  of the National
11Longitudinal Survey of Youth, indicated that the  average coefficient of
variation in earnings was  only 39.  The variability  in agricultural  income
is not due to  technical change;  the crops grown in the survey areas  -
millet, pigeon-pea, cotton--were not affected by  the  Indian Green
Revolution.  Agricultural  risk is  thus predominantly weather-based in this
environment, and it  is possible  to utilize  all sample years to  estimate  the
technology of production.
Finally, total wealth holdings in  the  six villages are very unequally
distributed.  Based on sample-period averages of real wealth for each farm
household, the  top 20 percent of farmers own over 54 percent of all wealth.
Mean total wealth holdings  (in 1983  rupees)  was  54,158  rupees, with a median
of 33,265 rupees.  The minimum average value of wealth holdings was 4,154;
the highest was 453,581 rupees.  Mean farm profits, also  in 1983  rupees, was
5,825.
3.  Specification of  the Technology and the  Measurement of Weather
To estimate  the profitability and riskiness of asset portfolios, we
aggregated the detailed information on  (annual) asset holdings  into nine
categories, by value, using 1983 prices:  unirrigated landholdings;  irrigated
landholdings, inclusive of  the value of  irrigation equipment;  draft animals,
including bullocks and water buffalo;  milk animals;  other  animals,  including
chickens and goats;  traditional farm  implements,  including manual plows,
carts, blades, hoes;  modern machinery, including  tractors;  liquid capital,
including financial assets and food stocks,  and consumption assets,
including consumer durables and housing.
To estimate the relationship between the  two moments of the weather
distribution and profits, we assume  that the  profit function is  a normalized
quadratic, where we normalize by  total wealth holdings.  Thus profits for
12each farmer k in period t are given by
(11)  Ukt  =  1  iaikt  +  I  2 Sijaiktojkt  +  7iaiktt  + Twt +  Ekt +  Vk
i  i  j
where ekt is  an i.i.d.  error and vk  is  a time-invariant error.  We  thus
assume  that farmers maximize short-run profits,  given the  set of ais, based
on the weather outcome realized after  all investments have been undertaken.
The  advantage of the  quadratic  form  (11)  is  that statistical  tests of global
quasi-concavity  (in  the ai) can be  readily implemented (Lau, 1976),  since
the  relevant Hessian matrix of second partials  consists only of  the
estimated 6is.  If  (11)  is  quasi-concave in the ai,  it  is  then possible  to
solve for the expected profit-maximizing investment portfolio for each
weather environment and  thus  to measure farmer-specific deviations  in
investment portfolios from their expected-profit optimum.  Moreover, the
riskiness  1 of each farmer's portfolio of  investments based on (3) and  (11)
is  of  a  simple  form:
(12)  F - sqrt((Z 7i  i)2)
i
The appropriate procedure to  obtain estimates  of the Pi, 6i,  and 7i
depends on what is  assumed about  the error  terms.  If the  time-invariant
error vk  is correlated with the  investments,  then a farmer  fixed effects
estimator (Mundlak, 1978)  provides consistent parameter estimates.  As  the
portfolio of ai's  is  measured at  the beginning of the  crop season, we assume
that neither wt,  the  realization of weather in period t, nor ekt,  the
unobserved shock to production, is known to  the farmer prior  to  the
implementation of his  asset plan for period t.  The orthogonality between
actual weather  in period t and the  ex ante  investment portfolio, net  of the
13permanent  distributional characteristics  of weather, is  testable  and we  test
it below.
The  remaining issue  in obtaining estimates  of the  technology parameters
is  the characterization of weather.  We  take an empirical approach.  We used
the daily rainfall information to construct  six measures of rainfall:  the
beginning and end dates of the  rainy season  (monsoon), where  the monsoon
onset is  determined as  the date after which  there has been at  least 20 mm of
rain within several consecutive days after June  1;  the fraction of days
within the season with rain;  the  average rain per day during the season, and
the length of up  to  two  intraseasonal drought periods.  Village  "folklore"
suggests  that the timing of  the monsoon is  the most important  aspect of
weather  (and uncertainty).  We therefore first regressed total  (real)
profits  from crop production and total  farm profits  (crop profits plus
profits from animal by-products) on the monsoon onset date and then on all
six weather variables, using all  farm households in the  ten ICRISAT
villages.
Random effects  estimates of the  influence of the rainfall variables on
profits are presented in Table 1.  The  initiation date of the monsoon does
significantly affect both crop and total profits--a one standard deviation
delay  (16 days)  in the start of  the monsoon reduces crop  (total) profits by
222  (150) rupees,  or by approximately 6 (3)  percent.  We could not reject
the hypothesis  that the  five other measures of rainfall,  included in the
specification reported in the  second column for each profit variable, do not
add to  the explanatory power of the  profit regressions.  Moreover,  inclusion
of the  other rainfall variables does not appreciably alter  the effect of the
onset variable.  Of the other  rainfall measures, the only potentially
important candidate is  the fraction of days with rain.  Accordingly, we use
14Table  1
Random Effects  Estimates:  Effects  of Rainfall Measures on Profits
(1983 Rupees)  from Crop Production and Total  Farm Profits
in Ten ICRISAT Villages
Crop Profits  Total Profits
Weather Variable  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Monsoon onset  date  -13.9  -15.7  -9.35  -12.4
(2 .68)a   (2.78)  (1.68)  (2.05)
End  of monsoon  - -1.29  - -.357
(0.37)  (0.10)
Fraction of days  in  season  - 1993  - 1722
with rain  (2.25)  (1.81)
Rain per day  in season  - -85.1  - -108
(1.44)  (1.70)
Consecutive days of  intraseasonal  - -2.67  - -4.95
drought  - first episode  (0.35)  (0.61)
Consecutive days of  intraseasonal  - -2.59  - -8.41
drought - second episode  (0.33)  (0.99)
Constant  7054  7619  7440  8219
(7.13)  (5.72)  (6.89)  (5.70)
F  82.0  25.2  87.7  26.9
2 (Breusch-Pagan)  7886  7809  8438  8394
n  2168  2168  2168  2168
a.  Absolute values of asymptotic  t-ratios  in parentheses.both this measure of rainfall  and the  onset date as weather variables  in our
estimation of (11),  and undertake additional tests  of their  importance.
That the quantity of  rainfall is  far less important than  its  timing is
consistent with the well-known difficulties experienced by researchers  using
rainfall quantities  to  explain yield  (Herdt, 1972)  or the allocative
behavior of farmers  (McGuirk and Boissert, 1988) based on aggregate Indian
data.4
The village-level  rainfall variables explain a small proportion of the
variability in  individual profits.  This might suggest  that an investigation
of the influence of  the riskiness of  these variables on farmer behavior
would not yield significant results--unmeasured variability  in profits, due
to  sources orthogonal  to  rainfall, might be a far more  important source of
risk.  However, even if all  of  the  residual variability  in profits were  not
merely measurement error,  it  is not necessarily true that  such variability
significantly alters behavior.  To  the extent that non-weather-induced
income variability is not covariant  across farmers within the village, such
risk might be considerably mitigated ex post by utilizing  locally-supplied
credit or via other village-based risk-sharing arrangements.  Binswanger and
Rosenzweig  (1987) have shown that most loans  in the  ICRISAT villages are
acquired from local  informal sources without access to  external funds.
Moreover, loans appear  to be  less  available when the  local economy is
subject  to a common shock, such as  a late  monsoon (Rosenzweig, 1988).  Thus
weather-induced profit variability may be  far  less insurable than
idiosyncratic or household-specific profit variability, necessitating ex
ante risk reduction through altering the  portfolio of investments
differentially sensitive  to weather outcomes.  Investments would then be
predominantly responsive to weather risk.
15To assess  the  relative  importance  of weather-induced and other sources
of  income variability on  consumption, we utilized the  information on
household food consumption  (85 percent of total consumption) that is
available  for nine years  in three of the  ICRISAT villages.  In column (1) of
Table  2 we report a fixed effects regression of food consumption on total
farm profits and the  age  of the household head.  The  results indicate that
household (food) consumption  is  not wholly  independent of current farm
profits--a 100 rupee  decrease  in profits reduces  food consumption by seven
rupees.  In  the second column of Table 2 we regress,  again using  fixed
effects, food consumption on farm profits measured net of the effects of  the
weather variables.  This profit measure  is  the residual  obtained from the
regression of  farm profits  on the weather variables.  These profit-weather
regressions were run separately for each household, since the  risk framework
suggests that weather should differentially affect profits according to  the
individual farmer's composition of assets ai.  This residual measure of
household-specific  income, orthogonal  to  income  determined by the weather,
has an effect on food consumption that  is  only  .6  of a percent that of
actual profits.  Common weather  shocks to  income  appear  to have
substantially greater consequences  for consumption than does  idiosyncratic
risk.
5
4.  Estimates  of  the Technology and Tests of the  Risk-Aversion Investment
Equilibrium
Table 3 reports some  test statistics based on our estimates of  the
normalized restricted profit function  (11).  We  included in the
specification, in addition to  the  eight  investment types  (excluding consumer
durables as  part of  the normalization) and the  two weather measures,  total
wealth and its  square,  to  test for  scale effects,  the number of adult male
16Table  2
Fixed Effects  Estimates:  Effects of Total Farm Profits, Inclusive  and
Exclusive of the  Effects of Weather, on Food Consumption
in Three ICRISAT Villages,  1975-1984
Variable  (1)  (2)
Age of household head  -85.5  -71.9
( 1 . 5 3 )a  (1.35)
Age squared  .438  .373
(0.78)  (0.70)
Farm profits  .0694
(5.76)
Farm profits  net of  effects of  .00047
weatherb  (0.02)
F  13.6  2.86
n  720  720
a.
b.
Absolute values of asymptotic  t-ratios in parentheses.
Residual from household-specific fixed-effects  regression of total farm
profits  on onset  of monsoon  in the village.Table  3
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0.018and female  family members, and the schooling and age of  the household head.
The  test  statistics indicate the timing of the monsoon has a statistically
significant effect on total  farm profitability, while the  set of  13
coefficients associated with the proportion of days with rain is not
statistically significant at even the ten percent level.  In subsequent
tests,  therefore, we only consider  the  influence of the monsoon onset
variable.
Does the principle measured risk variable, the monsoon onset date,
conform to  the location and scale transform assumption of  the mean-standard
deviation analysis of  risk?  As noted, if  the onset date  is normally
distributed, this property holds.  Figure 1 presents a normal quantile plot
of  this rainfall measure, based on 75  observations.  The plot suggests some
conformity to  the normal, with perhaps  fatter tails.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test statistic  is  .119, which is  only statistically significant at the 20
percent  level of significance.  We thus  cannot reject  the assumption that
the monsoon onset date has a normal distribution.
Of the other test statistics,  the  results indicate  the absence of
technological scale effects on profits.  Differences  in investment
portfolios across wealth classes evidently do not arise from technical scale
economies.  The results  also indicate  that schooling has no effects on
profits, but reject the hypothesis that  the age of the  farmer does not
affect profits  (the marginal return is  positive at sample mean values).
These latter results  are consistent with the hypothesis that  in environments
subject  to  risk but characterized by  stationarity, experience, but not
formal  schooling, has  real payoffs, as  found in Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1985).  The tests  also reject the hypothesis that the  size of the  family
labor force does not influence profits.  This  result appears  to contradict
17Rainfall  Start  Date  Distribution

















ithe findings by Pitt and Rosenzweig  (1986)  and by Benjamin  (1988),  based on
Indonesian data, indicating the perfect substitutability of hired and family
labor.6
A necessary and sufficient condition for the global  quasi-concavity of
the profit function  (11)  in the ai  is  that the Hessian matrix of second
partials with respect to  the ai, consisting solely of the  6 ijs,  be negative
semi-definite.  This  in turn implies  that all  of the eigenvalues of the
Hessian be non-positive.  Based on our  set of point estimates of  the  6ij,
six of  the eight eigenvalues were negative.  To  test if  the non-negative
eigenvalues  indicate rejection of quasi-concavity, we  implemented the  test
proposed by Lau (1978).  We  reestimated (11)  replacing the matrix of Sijs  by
parameters corresponding to  the Cholesky factorization of that matrix.  In
particular, if D is  the Hessian matrix of 6ijs,  then the Cholesky
factorization is
(13)  D - LCL',
where C is  a diagonal matrix of  Cholesky factors, L is a unit lower
triangular matrix, and L' is  its  transpose.  Non-linear  least squares
estimates of (11),  with  (13)  replacing the  6ij,  yield direct estimates  of
the Cholesky factors, which also  should be non-positive.
The  bottom part of Table 3 reports  the estimates  of the  Cholesky
factors  for seven of  the eight  investment  inputs.  We dropped all variables
indicated not  to  be statistically significant  in Table 3 and milk animals,
which also had no statistically significant effect in the linear
specification of  (11),  to  conserve parameters  (249 parameters needed to be
estimated).  These results  indicate  that we  cannot reject  quasi-concavity at
any reasonable level of statistical significance, due  to  the two non-
18negative Cholesky factors being measured with very little precision.
However, our point estimates of  the  6ij  make  it  impossible to find a set of
ai that  maximize  expected  profits.
In Table 4 we present the computed marginal profit level effects,
evaluated at  the  sample means,  and the  marginal profit variance effects,
with their associated asymptotic t-ratios,  for all eight  investment  inputs
based on the normalized profit function parameter estimates.  Sample mean
investment  shares are reported in the  leftmost column, with their  standard
deviations.  All estimated effects,  reported in columns  two and three, are
relative  to  the effects of consumer durables and housing.  The results
reject the hypothesis that the  investment  inputs have identical profit
variance or profit level  effects.  The Spearman rank correlation across  the
eight types of  capital stocks  between level and variance effects  is
positive,  in conformity to  expression  (6),  but not statistically significant
at the  15 percent level.  The principle deviants  from the risk-aversion
investment equilibrium condition are  the liquid assets and draft animal
categories--there appears to  be severe underinvestment  in both assets
despite  their not contributing, on the margin, to  increasing profit
variability.  Exclusion of draft animals  leads  to  a rank correlation between
level and variability effects of  .68,  which is  statistically significant at
the  .01 level.  Exclusion of both draft animals  and  liquid assets yields a
rank correlation of  .83,  which is  also statistically significant at  the  .01
level.
What may account  for  the underinvestment  in both liquid assets and
draft animals?  The framework set  out in section 1 does not accommodate the
possibility  that specific capital  items may be more  or  less useful  in
smoothing consumption ex post.  With the x-function having as  arguments  not
19Table 4
Estimated Normalized Profit Level  and Profit Variance Effects of
Changes  in the Shares of Productive Capital Items
Relative to Consumer Durable  and Housing Wealtha
Share of Total  Marginal Profit Level  Marginal Profit Var-
Capital Item  Wealth  (ai)  Effect  (8a/8a i)  iance Effect (Par  /ai)
Irrigated land  0.132  0.0656  0.0645
(0.226)b   (2 . 4 5)c  (0.80)c
Dry land  0.591  0.0289  -.0496
(0.317)  (1.62)  (0.78)
Traditional imple-  0.0073  1.285  1.184
ments  (0.013)  (3.87)  (1.20)
Modern implements  0.00376  0.127  3.891
(0.0403)  (0.63)  (8.86)
Draft animals  0.0223  1.167  -0.644
(0.0312)  (10.6)  (1.34)
Milk animals  0.0249  0.00234  -0.152
(0.0433)  (0.02)  (0.47)
Other  livestock  0.0174  0.156  0.568
(0.0381)  (1.35)  (2.39)
Liquid assets  0.0806  0.0928  -2.45
(0.0826)  (2.22)  (1.40)
Consumer durables  0.121
and housing
Spearman rank correlation,  .262
level and variance effects
Spearman rank correlation,  .679
excluding draft animals
Spearman rank correlation,  .829
excluding draft animals  and liquid assets
a.  Computed from normalized restricted profit function estimates  at sample
means of ai .
b.  Standard deviation in parentheses  in column.
c.  Absolute values  of asymptotic t-ratios  in parentheses  in column.only total wealth but ai as  well,  the  equilibrium condition (6) becomes
(6')  V f  -=  VOa[a  +  ar].
i  i  i
If  (6')  is  the correct characterization of the equilibrium, then without
prior knowledge of the  association between the profit variability and ex
post consumption smoothing effects K  for each ai,  it  is no longer possible
i
to know how profit level  and profit variability effects will be  correlated.
It  is  not surprising that  liquid assets  (financial assets and food
stocks) play a role in  smoothing consumption as  well as  provide a source  of
funds for purchasing variable  inputs.  However, our analysis  of the
transaction records  from the  original six villages covering the entire
survey period also  indicates that  the  purchase and sale  of draft animals
accounted for  72.9 percent  of all market transactions  involving investment
durables.  The high turnover rate for draft animals suggests  that this
capital  item may also be playing a role in consumption smoothing predominant
among the other  durable agricultural  stocks.  If  so,  then  in periods in
which weather has been particularly poor, both the level of  liquid assets
and stocks  of draft animals may be depleted and thus  exhibit high marginal
profit level returns.  For given profit variability effects, however,
overinvestment  in conventionally-characterized liquid assets and in  draft
animals  in normal periods may be  observed, given their consumption smoothing
role.  An investigation of optimal  stock behavior  is beyond the  scope of
this  paper, but  is  considered in Rosenzweig and Wolpin  (1989)  in  the context
of a dynamic stochastic model.
5.  Weather Risk, Wealth and the Riskiness  and Profitability of Farm
Investment Portfolios
20Based on the estimates  of the  profit function and the actual  asset
portfolios ai  of  the household we  can construct  individual measures of
portfolio riskiness r, from  (13),  for each farm household.  There is
considerable  inter-household variability in F--based on survey-period
averages  for each household, the  sample mean of F is  .000632 and the
standard deviation is  .000539.  At the  sample mean of wealth, the mean
estimate of r implies an average  standard deviation in total profits  of 544
rupees at  the mean standard deviation of  the monsoon onset;  the average
coefficient of variation in profits associated with the average F measure of
portfolio weather sensitivity  is  thus  9.3.  At the  same  (mean) wealth level,
a one standard deviation increase in r raises  the coefficient of variation
of profits to  17.3.
To directly assess whether portfolio riskiness and profitability per
unit of wealth are positively associated in the  sample, as  should be  true  in
the risk-averse investment equilibrium, we  regressed, using fixed effects,
farm profits divided by  total wealth (H/W) on the r  measure of riskiness and
the farmer's age  and age squared.  The  results were:
(14)  II/W - 5.54 r +  .00593-age - .000056-age squared
(4.31)  (2.36)  (2.24)  n - 2130 F(3,1825) - 8.54
where t-ratios  are in parentheses.  Farm households with production asset
portfolios  less  sensitive to weather variability sacrifice profitability, in
conformity to  the investment risk framework--a one standard deviation
decrease in portfolio riskiness lowers average profits by  162  rupees at the
mean level of wealth.
The risk framework suggests that the  variation in portfolio riskiness
across  farm households and over time should be related to  the  first two
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a.  Absolute  values  of  asymptotic t-ratios  in parentheses.effect of a mean-preserving shift in the  standard deviation of weather on
portfolio  riskiness and profitability may depend on the  total level of
wealth holdings.  A problem with testing for wealth effects  is  that at any
given point in time both accumulated wealth as well as  the  investment
portfolio will reflect  the farm household's subjective risk preferences,
which, as  shown in Binswanger (1980),  vary across the farmers  in our sample.
The observed cross-household association between wealth and the risk
characteristics  of the asset portfolio, given heterogeneity in risk
preferences, does not conform to  the  result that would be obtained by
randomly assigning wealth levels across  farmers.  To the extent that
preferences  for risk are time-invariant, a fixed effects procedure will
provide consistent estimates  of wealth effects  on portfolio allocations.
However, because  the moments of the weather distribution are  also time-
invariant (under stationarity), use of  the fixed effects procedure does not
allow the  identification of the direct effects  of the characteristics  of the
weather distribution on portfolio choice.
The ICRISAT data allow two alternative procedures  that may circumvent
the bias due  to  risk-preference heterogeneity.  First, we  can exploit  the
farmer-specific measures of  (partial) risk aversion revealed in the
experimental lottery games reported in Binswanger  (1980);  that  is,  we can
treat risk preferences as  observables and  "control" for them.  An
alternative procedure  is  to use  inherited wealth, also available in the
data, instead of current wealth.  To the  extent that the wealth inherited by
a farmer  is  orthogonal to his preferences  for risk, use  of inherited rather
than current wealth reduces biases associated with heterogeneity.
In Table 5 we report reduced-form estimates  of the effects  on portfolio
riskiness r of changes  in the village-specific mean and coefficient of
22variation  (CV) of the  monsoon onset date,  household total wealth and the
onset CV  interacted with wealth, based on  the data from the  six original
villages where the longer time-series  of weather are  available.  In the
first column, the  coefficients obtained using the random effects estimation
procedure are  reported.  The results conform  to  the  risk-aversion model in
which farmers  are characterized by decreasing relative  risk aversion and/or
in which wealth contributes to  ex post consumption smoothing.  At the  sample
median of wealth,  an increase  in the  onset CV significantly decreases
portfolio riskiness--a one standard deviation  increase  in the  CV  (29.5)
lowers r by 20 percent.  The set  of coefficients also  indicate that  the
effect of  the weather CV on portfolio riskiness declines  sharply with
wealth--at  the mean wealth level,  F is  lowered by only  7.6 percent when the
CV is higher by one standard deviation.  Indeed, above wealth levels
corresponding to the top quintile of  the wealth distribution (75,376
rupees),  there is  no negative effect of weather variability on portfolio
riskiness.  The  top  20 percent of  farm households are evidently able  or
willing  to  completely  absorb  profit  risk.
The Hausman test  indicates rejection of the hypothesis  that the right-
hand-side variables  in the  specification reported in the  first column of
Table 5 are uncorrelated with the  residual.  In the  second column we  report
estimates  that attempt  to  correct for preference heterogeneity by including
the measure of each farmer's partial  risk aversion parameter, from the  five
rupees  level in game nine  reported in  Binswanger (1980).  These  estimates
are similar  to  those obtained without the  risk preference measures.  They
also provide support  for the hypothesis that the  investment portfolio  is
related to preferences  for risk.  At  the  sample mean of  the  onset CV,
farmers with greater aversion to risk according to  the  experimental games do
23have lower-P investment portfolios, and increases in the variability in the
start of the monsoon induces more risk-averse farmers  to  lower  the riskiness
of their portfolios more strongly than less  risk-averse  farmers.  However,
the  Hausman test  statistic still  indicates the  existence of heterogeneity
bias.
The third column of Table  5 reports  the  fixed effects estimates of the
determinants of F, which only permit the identification of the direct wealth
and the CV-wealth  interaction effects.  These  are highly statistically
significant and conform in sign pattern to  their random effects
counterparts,  indicating decreases  in the effects  of the weather  CV on F  as
wealth levels rise;  the magnitudes are approximately half those estimated
using  random effects.  In the  last  two columns, we  replace  contemporaneous
wealth with inherited wealth  (in 1983  rupees).  These results  are similar in
magnitude to  those  obtained with current wealth levels, and also indicate
that  farmers shift  to  less  risky  investment portfolios  in response to
increases  in weather variability, but only among farmers with inherited
wealth levels below the  top  30th percentile of the  inherited wealth
distribution.  And, again, particularly so  among farmers that the
experimental  data indicate  are more risk averse.
The  steep fall  in the effects of weather variability on portfolio
riskiness as wealth levels  rise indicated  in Table 5 does not appear to be
solely accounted  for by wealth differences  in ex post consumption smoothing
capabilities.  The estimates  in Rosenzweig and Stark (1989)  indicate  that a
unit  increase  in the standard deviation of profits  is associated with a  .333
rise  in the standard deviation in food consumption for households at the
bottom 25th percentile of the  wealth distribution.  The effect of profit
variability on consumption variability only declines  to  .321 for households
24at  the  top 80th percentile.  While  this  fall  in the  sensitivity of
consumption to  profit volatility by wealth level  is statistically
significant,  it cannot account  for  our findings  of a steep decline  in the
response  of the  weather sensitivity of  investment portfolios to  weather
variability as wealth  levels  increase.  The estimates  of Table  5 thus
suggest  that farmers  are  characterized by decreasing relative  risk aversion.
Although we cannot  compute the profit-maximizing portfolio based on  the
profit-function parameter estimates,  as  discussed, we can estimate the
reduced-form relationships between farm profits,  weather variability, and
wealth using the  same procedures  as  employed in obtaining estimates of the
determinants of portfolio riskiness.  And the  equilibrium condition (6)
implies  that the  coefficient sign patterns  for profits should be the  same as
those  for r.  Table 6 reports  the  estimates of  the reduced-form determinants
of profits.  The  specifications employed in obtaining the profit estimates
are  identical  to  those  in Table  5 except  that the  current-year onset  date is
also  included, since the  current weather state affects profits  (but not the
pre-season composition of assets). 8
In  the  specifications employing  contemporaneous wealth  levels,  the
coefficient estimates are similar  in  sign patterns  to  those  of Table 5.  The
estimates appear  to be  robust  to estimation procedure, however.  In
particular,  the CV-wealth interaction and onset date coefficients are almost
identical when estimated using random or fixed effects, and the Hausman test
indicates only marginal rejection  (.06  level)  of the hypothesis  that
heterogeneity may be biasing the  set of profit-level coefficients,  in
contrast to  the strong rejection for the  r estimates.  The experimentally-
obtained risk aversion variables also  do not  appear to  be related to
profits.
25Table  6
Determinants of Profit Levels:  Six ICRISAT Villages
Variable/  Random  Random  Fixed  Random  Random
Estimation Procedure  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects
Coefficient of varia-  -24.7
tion in onset (CV)  (1.33)a
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(5.15)
Inherited wealth  (x10 4 )
Onset date  -14.2
(2.11)
Mean onset date  247.8
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0.61The  first-column parameter estimates  indicate that  at wealth  levels up
to  84,830 rupees, corresponding to  the  top  19 percent of the sample  farmers
ranked by wealth, higher variability  in  the monsoon onset date  is  associated
with significantly lower average profits.  The wealth distribution cutoff
point, where weather variability no  longer depresses mean profits, is
remarkably  similar  to  the wealth cutoff at which weather variability no
longer decreases  portfolio riskiness.  The costs  of decreased riskiness  are
not small  and are borne significantly more heavily by the  less  wealthy.  At
the mean wealth level,  a one standard deviation increase in the onset date
coefficient  of variation  (29.5)  lowers average profits by 264 rupees,  or by
4.5 percent.  At the  wealth median, profits are  lower by 443  rupees for
every one  standard deviation increase  in the  onset date CV,  a reduction in
mean profits of 15  percent, while for farmers with wealth holdings below the
25th percentile, average profits  are lowered by 555  rupees.  This  cost of
risk reduction represents  35 percent of average profits  for the  lowest
quartile  of farmers.
The specifications employing inherited rather than current wealth,
reported in the last two  columns of Table  6, are  estimated less  precisely
but also  indicate that less-wealthy farmers  are significantly more willing
to  sacrifice profit levels  than are wealthier farmers  in response to
increases  in weather variability.  The estimated cutoff  is  53,081 rupees,
corresponding  to  the  55th percentile  of the  inherited wealth distribution.
6.  Conclusion
Income variability is  a prominent feature of the  experience  of rural
agents  in low-income countries.  In this  paper, we have obtained evidence,
based on measures of rainfall variability,  indicating that the agricultural
26investment portfolio behavior of  farmers  in such settings reflects  risk
aversion, due evidently to  limitations on ex post consumption-smoothing
mechanisms.  Our results suggest  that uninsured weather risk is a
significant cause of lower efficiency and lower average incomes--a one
standard deviation decrease  in the  standard deviation of  the  timing of the
rainy season would raise average profits by up  to  35  percent among farmers
in the lowest wealth quartile.  Moreover, weather variability induces a
more unequal distribution of average  incomes  for a given distribution of
wealth.  This  latter feature, resulting from the  evident willingness of
wealthier farmers  to  absorb more risk while reaping higher  average returns,
is evidence  against the common supposition that smaller  farms are more
efficient than larger farms,  a presumption that tends  to  ignore the returns
to  agricultural  investment holdings.  However, we also found that among the
top quintile of  farmers increased weather risk does not reduce
profitability.  This  suggests that  there  is  some scope for efficiency gains
from  an equalizing redistribution of land.  The  results also suggest  that
improvements  in the  abilities of farmers  to  smooth consumption, perhaps via
increased consumption credit, would increase  the  profitability of
agricultural  investments;  similarly, the  availability of rain insurance
would both raise overall profit levels in high-risk-areas and decrease
earnings  inequality within those areas.
Given the apparent private and social gains from weather  insurance,
specifically for monsoon  timing insurance, why we do not observe a market
for it?  While  the supply of  insurance against  the vagaries of rainfall
should not be afflicted by moral hazard among farmers,  our results  indicate
that the demand for rainfall  insurance may be  quite weak.  First, a
substantial proportion of profit risk is  idiosyncratic, and evidently well-
27diffused.  Second, demand for  weather  insurance would come primarily, if not
exclusively, from poor farmers.  Wealthy farmers are evidently unwilling to
pay a premium, via reduced averaged profits,  to  reduce  their exposure to  ex
ante risks.
Our  study has  only been concerned with behavior  responsive to  the  first
two moments  of  the weather distribution.  Although this appears to be
supported by the  data,  longer time-series  on rainfall  (and other aspects  of
weather) may permit richer models of risk behavior.  Our analysis has  also
taken the  distribution of total wealth holdings  as  given, although our
empirical analysis accommodated heterogeneity  in risk preferences and  its
consequences for  the  accumulation of wealth levels.  Finally, our model was
concerned solely with the  role of assets  in mitigating risk ex ante and
assumed away the dynamic behavior,  in particular the holding of assets  to
smooth consumption ex post.  Indeed, we obtained some evidence  that  in  the
environment studied, conventionally-defined liquid assets  and draft animals
appeared to be traded intertemporally  in response  to  realized income
fluctuations.  A dynamic  analysis of investment and consumption smoothing
incorporating weather risk may shed additional light on the determination of
agricultural investments.  Such an approach may also be a more appropriate
framework with which  to  study savings behavior in low-income  rural settings,
where  investment and consumption decisions are closely linked.
28Footnotes
1.  Antle  (1987)  is  one of  the only econometric studies to  investigate
actual  risk behavior.  He employs a random coefficients procedure to
estimate  the pre-harvest labor allocation rules of Indian rice  farmers,  thus
assuming that risk attitudes are randomly distributed, rather  than
reflective of actual wealth holdings.  In that study, the strong assumption
is also made  that a farmer's allocation of inputs  for a particular crop are
independent of the  risks and other  technological factors associated with
other  crops  grown.
2.  An important  assumption, embedded in  (2) and  (3),  is  that  the &i  are
chosen prior  to  the realization of  the stochastic variables, but once
uncertainty  is  resolved, all other  (variable) inputs  are allocated to
maximize profits.  Under  this assumption, functions  (2) and  (3) reflect
solely the  technology of production and the  impact of  the weather variable
on input and output prices  (as  in Antle, 1987).  Risk preferences  influence
only the allocation of  the 5i.  The model  is  thus separable  in variable
inputs,  but  not  in  capital  stocks.
3.  Thus, we cannot test the  separation theorem with these data.
4.  We also  regressed, using random effects, the  total value of crop output
on the rainfall variables.  These  estimates also  indicated the importance of
rainfall  timing relative  to  quantity.  Moreover, the monsoon onset date
explained significantly more  of the variability in output than in profits,
with a one  standard deviation in the  onset date reducing real  output value
by 8.4 percent.  The stronger effect of the  timing of the  monsoon on output
compared to profits reflects  the ex post adjustment of variable  input costs
by farmers  after the resolution of  the  timing of the  rainy season.  The
29scope for ex post, profit-maximizing  input adjustment thus reduces profit
risk relative  to  output or yield risk.
5.  The residual  also contains measurement error so  that  it  is  not possible
to  quantify the  effect of the  true variability in profits net of weather
shocks.
6.  Our estimates  of the  marginal returns  to male  and  female family
members,  at the  sample means,  indicates a return for males  25  percent higher
than  that for  females.  This almost wholly reflects male/female differences
in labor force participation.
7.  Village  informants have suggested that  the  sample period was
characterized by worse-than-average rainfall  levels;  sample-period
variability in rainfall was not extraordinary.
8.  Inclusion of  the  current onset data  in  the  reduced-form F equations,
based on the  investment portfolios, did not add significantly to  the
explanatory power of  those equations, as  expected.
30References
Antle, John M.,  "Econometric Estimation of Producers' Risk Attributes,"
Journal of Agricultural  Economics, August 1987,  505-522.
Bardhan, Pranab K.,  "Size,  Productivity and Returns  to Scale:  An Analysis
of Farm-Level Data in India Agriculture,"  Journal of Political  Economy
81,  November/December  1973,  1370-1386.
Behrman, Jere and Anil Deolalikar,  "Wages and Labor Supply in Rural India:
The Role of Health, Nutrition and  Seasonality,"  in Sahn, D. E.,  ed.,
Causes  and Implications of Seasonal Variability in Household Food
Insecurity, Washington, DC:  International  Food Policy Research
Institute,  1987.
Bell, Clive, and T. N. Srinivasan, "The Demand for Attached Farm Servants  in
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Punjab,"  1985,  mimeo.
Benjamin, Dwayne,  "Household Composition and Labor Demand:  A Test of Rural
Labor Market Efficiency,"  Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University,
RPDS Discussion Paper No.  140,  November 1988.
Binswanger, Hans  P.,  "Attitudes Towards Risk:  Experimental Measurement in
Rural India,"  American Journal of Agricultural Economics  62,  August
1980, 395-407.
,"Attitudes Towards  Risk:  Theoretical Implications of an
Experiment in Rural India,"  Economic Journal 91,  September 1981,  867-
889.
and Mark R. Rosenzweig,  "Credit Markets, Wealth and Endowments  in
Rural South India,"  Agriculture and Rural  Development Department,
World Bank Discussion Paper No. ARU59, October 1986.
Dasgupta, Partha, and D. Ray, "Inequality, Malnutrition and Unemployment:  A
Critique of  the Market Mechanism,"  1984, mimeo.
31Dillon, J. and Peter Scandizzo,  "Risk Attitudes  of Subsistence Farmers  in
Northeast  Brazil,"  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 60,
September 1978,  425-435.
Feder, Gershon, "The Impact of Uncertainty in a Class of Objective
Functions,"  Journal  of Economic Theory  16,  December 1977,  504-512.
Herdt, R. W.,  The Impact of Rainfall and Irrigation on Crops  in Punjab,
1907-1948,"  Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, March-May 1972.
Lau, Lawrence J.,  "A Characterization of the Normalized Restricted Profit
Function,"  Journal  of Economic Theory 12,  1976,  131-163.
, "Testing and Imposing Monotonicity, Convexity and Quasi-
Convexity Constraints,"  in Production Economics:  A Dual Approach to
Theory and Applications  1978, 409-453.
Lopez, Ramon  E.,  "Structural Models of  the  Farm Household that Allow for
Interdependent-Utility and Profit-Maximization Decisions,"  in Singh,
Inderjit, Lyn Squire and John Strauss,  eds.,  Agricultural Household
Models,  Baltimore:  The Johns  Hopkins Press,  1986,  306-325.
Mazumdar, Dipak, "The Theory of Sharecropping, with Labor Market Dualism,"
Economica 42,  August 1975,  261-271.
McGuirk, Anya M. and Richard N. Boisvert,  "A Dynamic Model of Acreage
Allocation Decisions with Endogenous Land Quality,"  December 1988,
mimeo.
Meyer, Jack,  "Two-Moment Decision Models and Expected Utility Maximization,"
American Economic Review 77,  June  1987,  428-430.
Moscardi,  E. and Alain de Janvry,  "Attitudes Towards Risk Among Peasants:  An
Econometric Approach,"  American Journal of Agricultural Economics  59,
August 1977,  710-716.
32Mundlak, Yair, "On the Pooling of Time  Series and Cross Section Data,"
Econometrica 46,  January 1978,  69-85.
Paxson, Christina H.,  "Household Savings  in Thailand:  Responses to  Income
Shocks,"  Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, RPDS Discussion
Paper No.  137,  February 1988.
Pitt, Mark M. and Mark R. Rosenzweig, "Agricultural Prices, Food
Consumption, and the Health and Productivity of Indonesian
Farmers,"  Agricultural Household Models, Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins
Press,  1986,  153-182
Rosenzweig, Mark R.,  "Risk, Implicit Contracts and the  Family in Rural Areas
of Low-Income Countries,"  Economic Journal  98,  December 1988,  1148-
1170.
and Oded Stark, "Consumption Smoothing, Migration and Marriage,"
Journal of Political Economy  97,  August 1989.
and Kenneth I. Wolpin, "Specific Experience, Household Structure
and Intergenerational  Transfers:  Farm Family Land and Labor
Arrangements  in Developing Countries,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics
100,  Supplement, 1985.
Sen, Amartya K.,  "Peasants and Dualism with or without Surplus Labor,"
Journal  of Political Economy  74, June  1966, 425-450.
Singh, R. P.,  Hans  P. Binswanger, and N. S. Jodha, Manual of Instructions
for Economic  Investigators  in ICRISAT's Village Level Studies,
International Crop Research Institute for the  Semi-Arid Tropics,
Hyderabad, India, May 1985.
Tobin, James,  "Liquidity Preferences  as  Behavior Towards Risk,"  Review of
Economic Studies  25,  February 1958,  65-86.
33Wolpin, Kenneth I., "A New Test of the  Permanent  Income Hypothesis:  The
Impact of Weather on the  Income  and Consumption of Farm Households  in
India,"  International Economic Review 23,  October 1982,  583-594.
34